ZSFGH Is Not Safe for Vulnerable Patients: Documented Attacks and Thefts Show DPH’s Security Model Is Failing

December 23, 2025

Zuckerberg San Francisco General Hospital (ZSFGH) is a city within a city—a dense, vertical campus with constant foot traffic, high-acuity medicine, psychiatric emergencies, and complex social-service needs moving through the same corridors. Vulnerable inpatients can’t “opt out” of that environment. They can’t leave when violence erupts. They depend on the hospital’s security posture to be strong, visible, and fast.

ZSFGH carries an extreme ER burden and high-risk volume

Public reporting citing California health data has highlighted ZSFGH as one of the hospitals with a very high share of homeless ER patients (22% in 2023), and notes heavy recidivism in SF ER usage.

Whatever the exact percentages year to year, the operational reality is the same: ZSFGH is an intense, high-risk campus—not an outpatient clinic.

DPH’s own documents show the policy direction: “reduce law enforcement presence”

DPH materials presented to the Health Commission frame the security strategy around “prevention/equity” and reducing the presence of law enforcement.

DPH also reports performance using metrics like how often BERT interventions are completed without law enforcement present (e.g., 87% cited in staffing materials).

BERT may help in some situations—but a hospital campus doesn’t become “safe” because law enforcement was avoided. It becomes safe when violence is prevented, contained quickly, and deterred.

Weapons are a daily reality, not a talking point

ZSFGH security reporting documents thousands of weapons/contraband confiscations through screening:

3,394 in FY 2020–2021
Nearly 4,000 in FY 2023–2024

That is exactly why minimizing sworn presence as a goal is backwards on this campus.

Documented attacks, thefts, and injuries reported in the news

These aren’t hypotheticals. Recent public reporting includes:

Fatal stabbing of a social worker inside ZSFGH (Ward 86) — December 2025
A UCSF social worker was attacked and repeatedly stabbed inside the hospital; charges were later upgraded after the victim died. ABC News+2San Francisco Chronicle+2
This incident has triggered major public scrutiny of ZSFGH safety conditions and security posture. San Francisco Chronicle+1
Ambulance smash-and-grab / attempted theft of emergency equipment — paramedic injured — September 28, 2024 (ZSFGH campus)
Police and news outlets reported an ambulance was broken into and equipment stolen; a paramedic was injured during the incident. NBC Bay Area+1
Security failure involving missing patient logbook with sensitive information — April 2024
News reports said a patient logbook containing personal/medical information went missing, prompting a security/policy review. CBS News+1
High volume of reported workplace-violence incidents and regulatory scrutiny (context emphasized in reporting after the fatal stabbing)
Major reporting after the December 2025 killing describes long-running safety concerns, workplace-violence incident volumes, and prior enforcement actions and warnings. San Francisco Chronicle

Bottom line: the public record shows violence and theft-type incidents are occurring at or tied to the ZSFGH campus and operations—and they’re not isolated “one-offs.”

It’s also a theft and property-loss vulnerability—and the risk is structural

DPH’s own security scope includes protecting equipment, supplies, and medications and investigating theft.

When visible deterrence and patrol coverage are reduced in a “city within a city,” the predictable result is more opportunity: theft, diversion risk, property damage, and repeat offenders who learn the gaps.

A working fix (short, operational, and realistic)

ZSFGH needs district-style coverage that matches the threat environment:

Assigned posts in predictable high-risk locations.
Uniformed deputy foot patrols across corridors, stairwells, entrances, and transition points.
Plainclothes deputies on campus (in addition to posts and beats):
1. to catch theft/crime without telegraphing presence, and
2. to co-respond with BERT when appropriate—while preserving immediate peace-officer capability when violence erupts.

Bottom line

DPH’s own documents show a model optimized to reduce law enforcement presence, while ZSFGH’s own reporting shows weapons are constantly intercepted—and the news record now includes fatal violence, injuries, and theft incidents tied to the campus. San Francisco Chronicle+2NBC Bay Area+2

ZSFGH is not safe for vulnerable patients under the current posture. The standard must be real protection and real outcomes—not metrics that celebrate how often deputies were avoided.

Deputy’s Rapid Response at ZSFGH Likely Prevented Mass Casualty Stabbing — But Security Plan Still Keeps Deputies Out of Most Crises

December 9, 2025

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Deputy’s Rapid Response at ZSFGH Likely Prevented Mass Casualty Stabbing — But Security Plan Still Keeps Deputies Out of Most Crises

Deputy Sheriffs say DPH’s BERT model minimizes law-enforcement presence and relies on unarmed security in a vertical city of high-risk patients

San Francisco, CA — The San Francisco Deputy Sheriffs’ Association (SFDSA) is calling attention to the heroic actions of a Sheriff’s deputy at Zuckerberg San Francisco General Hospital (ZSFGH) and renewing its warning that the hospital’s current security model is designed to keep deputies out of most violent incidents while relying on unarmed security and clinical teams.

On December 4, 2025, a stabbing in Ward 86, ZSFGH’s HIV clinic, left UCSF social worker Alberto Rangel with multiple stab wounds. Despite rapid intervention and lifesaving efforts, Mr. Rangel later died from his injuries.

SFDSA President Ken Lomba says that while the deputy could not undo the initial wounds, his rapid intervention almost certainly prevented additional victims.

“What people aren’t being told is that our deputy didn’t just confront one dangerous situation — he likely prevented a mass-casualty stabbing inside that clinic,” Lomba said. “Ward 86 is a high-volume HIV clinic. If the assailant had been able to move freely down the hallway, we could be talking about multiple staff and patients stabbed. The only reason that didn’t happen is because a deputy was close enough to intervene within seconds.”

Unarmed security at the entrance, no fixed deputy post in the 80/90 complex

Under ZSFGH’s current security model, Building 80 – which houses the Ward 86 HIV clinic on the 6th floor – is part of the connected 80/90 complex, with its main public entrance on 22nd Street. According to our union members assigned to ZSFGH, that entrance is staffed by an unarmed private security guard seated at a desk, and DPH relies on additional private security guards who patrol the building’s interior. There is no fixed Sheriff’s deputy post in Building 80.

SFDSA later discovered, through its staffing records, that Building 80 previously had a Sheriff’s cadet post, but DPH eliminated that post in July 2025, leaving only unarmed private security at the public entrance and in the hallways.

In the connected Building 90, ZSFGH operates Ward 93, an Opiate Treatment Outpatient Program (OTOP) methadone clinic on the third floor. Public information lists Ward 93 as a methadone clinic serving adults with substance-use disorders, and our union members report that DPH assigns a private armed security guard inside Unit 93 who is not permitted to leave that unit. That means the one armed security presence in the 80/90 complex is effectively locked to a single clinic, while the rest of the building — including the path to Ward 86 — is covered only by unarmed guards and a greatly reduced number of deputies.

On December 4, a stabbing occurred in the 6th-floor Ward 86 hallway, where UCSF social worker Alberto Rangel was repeatedly stabbed and left in critical condition. An individual was later arrested on suspicion of carrying out the stabbing. Based on information from our members, the individual possibly moved past the unarmed security presence at the 22nd Street entrance and through the 80/90 complex to reach the 6th floor.

The only sworn law-enforcement officer in Building 80 at that time was a Sheriff’s deputy temporarily assigned there solely because DPH had requested protection for a doctor who had previously reported threats from the same individual. When the stabbing began in another area in a hallway, that deputy responded, intervened to stop the attack, helped secure the individual, and allowed medical staff to begin lifesaving care.

“This was not a building with a strong law-enforcement presence,” Lomba said. “It was an unarmed guard at the lobby desk, a handful of roving security guards, no fixed deputy post, and a deputy in Ward 86 only because a doctor had already been threatened. In the end, the only person who physically restrained the suspect and stopped the stabbing was a sworn deputy sheriff.”

A missed opportunity at City Clinic and delayed law-enforcement notification

San Francisco City Clinic, located at 356 7th Street in SoMa, is a DPH sexual-health clinic that does not have any assigned Sheriff’s deputy post. According to public news reports, on the same day as the Ward 86 killing, hours before the stabbing, the same individual went to City Clinic looking for a specific doctor he had been threatening. A clinic director hid the doctor, told the individual the doctor was not there, and then heard the individual say he would go to Ward 86 at ZSFGH to find that doctor later that day. The clinic and the hospital are roughly two miles apart, yet there is no public indication in those reports that either SFPD or the Sheriff’s Office was contacted at that point so law enforcement could attempt to locate or intercept the individual before he reached Ward 86.

Under DPH’s own Threat Management policy, multiple threats combined with a stated plan to go to a specific location to find a targeted provider appear to meet the definition of a “High Risk” case—the very category where the policy warns of imminent danger of serious injury or death and directs staff to notify both SFSD and SFPD. SFDSA is therefore asking DPH to explain why law enforcement was not called from City Clinic when staff had both credible threats and advance notice of the individual’s stated destination, and why the Sheriff’s Office was only brought in shortly before the attack instead of at the earliest warning.

Unanswered questions about DPH’s own threat policy

Through a public-records request under the California Public Records Act (CPRA), SFDSA’s counsel obtained DPH’s Threat Management flowchart, which outlines how threats are supposed to be classified and handled. According to that document, cases are classified as “High Risk” when there are multiple threats of violence and evidence of a violent plan directed at a specific person or location. In those situations, the policy says there is a high probability of imminent danger of injury or death, and the response should include contacting both the Sheriff’s Office and SFPD.

Public news reports about this case describe an individual who threatened staff over a period of time, went to San Francisco City Clinic looking for a specific doctor, told the clinic director he would go to Ward 86 at ZSFGH to find that doctor, and then later allegedly carried out a stabbing in Ward 86. Taken together, those facts appear to fit the very “High Risk” scenario DPH’s own Threat Management policy describes: multiple threats combined with a clear plan to seek out a targeted provider at a specific location.

DPH’s Threat Management flowchart, as produced to SFDSA, states that when a situation is classified as “High Risk,” both the Sheriff’s Office and SFPD should be notified. In this case, a doctor at Ward 86 had already reported threats from the same individual, and DPH specifically requested that a Sheriff’s deputy be assigned to protect that doctor on the day of the stabbing.

SFDSA is calling on DPH and its security leadership to answer two basic questions:

How was this case formally classified under DPH’s Threat Management policy — Low, Medium, or High Risk?
If it was treated as High Risk, were both SFSD and SFPD notified in accordance with that policy — and if not, why not?

“DPH’s own document, which we obtained through a CPRA request, says multiple threats plus a violent plan aimed at a specific person equals High Risk and should trigger calls to both the Sheriff’s Office and SFPD,” Lomba said. “The publicly reported facts about this case look exactly like that scenario. The public deserves a clear answer: did DPH follow its own High-Risk protocol before this attack — yes or no?”

A security model built to keep deputies out of the room

SFDSA says the tragedy in Ward 86 must be understood in the context of a security plan that intentionally reduced sworn staffing and routed most crises away from law enforcement.

In a series of plans and presentations to the Health Commission, the Department of Public Health (DPH):

Proposed cutting 11.4 deputy positions at ZSFGH, reducing deputies on the hospital work order from 30 FTE to 21 FTE.
Created a Behavioral Emergency Response Team (BERT) made up of psychiatric nurses and psych techs to respond to behavioral crises, perform de-escalation, administer medications, and manage restraints.
Chose to support BERT with non-uniformed cadets and private security personnel, rather than strengthening sworn coverage on high-risk units.
Reported that in the Emergency Department and other areas, over 80 percent of BERT activations now occur without any law-enforcement presence, and cited that as a success metric.
Stated that law-enforcement intervention could “have the unintended effect of escalating a situation” and described reducing the presence of deputies in DPH facilities as an explicit goal.

“DPH didn’t just trim numbers; they rewrote the model so that deputies are kept out of the room as much as possible,” Lomba said. “They built a system where psych staff, cadets, and unarmed guards are expected to handle the early, most dangerous seconds of an attack — and then deputies are supposed to show up later and clean up the aftermath.”

Not just one building — a vertical city of high-risk patients

The Association says this “response-only” approach is especially dangerous at ZSFGH because of how the campus is built and what it handles.

Zuckerberg San Francisco General is not a single hallway with a front desk. It is a dense, multi-building, multi-story campus of high-risk services:

San Francisco’s only Level-1 trauma center,
The City’s only 24/7 psychiatric emergency department, and
The primary safety-net hospital for many of the City’s most vulnerable residents, including people experiencing homelessness, serious mental illness, and substance-use disorders.

Multiple towers and specialty buildings — trauma and emergency, medical-surgical units, HIV and infectious-disease clinics like Ward 86, psychiatric emergency, acute psych, and high-risk outpatient programs — are stacked on top of one another and connected by elevators, stairwells, internal corridors, and secured passageways.

When a call comes in from an upper floor or a remote clinic, deputies must navigate multiple floors, secured access points, and crowded hallways before reaching the scene.

“On a campus like this, ‘response-only’ isn’t a theory problem; it’s a time-and-distance problem,” Lomba said. “Every minute of delay is more time for a stabbing, strangulation, or assault on staff to continue. When you cut deputies here, you don’t just pull them off one doorway — you thin sworn coverage across an entire vertical grid of trauma units, psych, and clinics all at once.”

Built on narrow statistics and flawed comparisons to LA and Alameda

DPH has repeatedly cited hospitals in Los Angeles County and Alameda County as models for its hybrid BERT and security approach. SFDSA argues those comparisons are fundamentally flawed:

LA and Alameda distribute trauma and psychiatric emergencies across multiple hospitals and trauma centers, with sheriff’s deputies and local police departments able to surge to incidents across a wide geographic area.
San Francisco concentrates most of that burden on one campus — ZSFGH — for roughly 1.5 million people in San Francisco and northern San Mateo County.
In the external systems DPH references, sworn law enforcement remains a core part of a co-responder model. At ZSFGH, the implementation has focused on reducing deputies and measuring success by how often BERT can operate without law enforcement present.

At the same time, DPH built its equity case on a narrow slice of data:

Internal memos and public statements highlighted that roughly half of use-of-force incidents in one reporting period involved Black patients, and that a high share of ED use-of-force involved Black patients compared to their percentage of ER visitors.
ZSFGH’s own annual reports, however, show that Black patients are about 12–15 percent of the hospital’s overall patient population, not 48–70 percent.
DPH has not publicly released the full breakdown of who is in the ED, PES, and psych units by race, or how many of those force incidents involved fights, weapons, or psychiatric restraints.

“DPH took a small number of high-risk incidents and used that percentage to argue deputies themselves were an ‘equity problem,’” Lomba said. “They never showed the full picture of who is in those units, why staff called for help, or how many times deputies prevented serious injury or death. That narrow statistic was then used to sell a plan that civilianized security and kept deputies out of the room.”

What SFDSA is demanding now

In light of the Ward 86 killing and the documented design of the ZSFGH security plan, SFDSA is calling for immediate changes:

Restore and expand assigned deputy-sheriff posts on high-risk units and posts at ZSFGH, including Ward 86, the Emergency Department, Psychiatric Emergency Services, and critical inpatient floors, with a fully staffed sworn patrol presence on campus.
End the experiment of replacing deputies with cadets, private security, and BERT-only responses in areas where staff routinely face weapons, severe psychiatric crises, and violent assaults.
Publish a full, unit-level analysis of use-of-force and patient demographics, so the public can see the true denominators behind DPH’s equity claims, including ED/PES/psych race breakdowns and the reasons staff call for help.
Establish an independent safety and equity review of the ZSFGH security model, including BERT, cadets, private security, and deputy staffing, with full participation from frontline unions representing deputies, nurses, physicians, social workers, and other hospital staff.
Adopt a true co-responder model in which BERT clinicians and deputies respond together to the most dangerous situations, instead of sending clinicians and non-sworn staff in first and treating law enforcement as a last resort.

“The deputy in Ward 86 did everything right and likely prevented more people from being stabbed,” Lomba said. “What failed that day was not the deputy — it was a security plan that deliberately kept most deputies away from high-risk units in the first place. That plan has to change before we lose anyone else.”

Media Contact
San Francisco Deputy Sheriffs’ Association
Phone: (415) 696-2428

Internal DPH Memos Show ZSFGH Security Plan Was Built to Keep Deputies Out

December 7, 2025

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Internal DPH Memos Show ZSFGH Security Plan Was Built to Keep Deputies Out

Deputy Sheriffs’ Association says DPH cut sworn staffing, misused equity data, and spent more on an unproven BERT / private-security model before fatal stabbing of UCSF social worker

San Francisco, CA — The San Francisco Deputy Sheriffs’ Association (SFDSA) is releasing internal Department of Public Health (DPH) documents showing that security changes at Zuckerberg San Francisco General Hospital (ZSF GH) were deliberately structured to keep law enforcement out of most patient crises — even as weapons seizures, assaults, and workplace-violence incidents remained high.

On December 4, 2025, a UCSF social worker was fatally stabbed multiple times in Ward 86 at ZSF GH. A nearby deputy intervened, disarmed the attacker, and allowed staff to begin life-saving measures, but the victim later died. SFDSA President Ken Lomba says this tragedy is the predictable outcome of a policy that treated deputies as a problem to be reduced, not a safety partner to be strengthened.

“DPH used the language of ‘equity’ and ‘best practices’ to justify a security experiment that removed deputies from high-risk units and posts and replaced them with BERT clinicians, cadets, and unarmed guards,” said Lomba. “Their own memos brag that almost nine out of ten behavioral emergencies now happen with no law enforcement present. On Ward 86, we saw the real-world result of that decision.”

DPH’s own memos: cut deputies, keep them out of the room

In a June 14, 2021 Safety Services Staffing Plan Proposal, DPH proposed to:

Reduce Sheriff’s deputies at ZSF GH by 11.4 positions (about 14.5 FTE including backfill), and
Add 31.9 FTE of Psychiatry Nurses and Licensed Psychiatric Technicians, plus 2.5 FTE Care Experience Health Workers, to form a Behavioral Emergency Response Team (BERT).

The same plan specifies that non-uniformed cadets would provide clinical support in patient intervention, function as “healthcare ambassadors,” and conduct campus patrols.

A later August 28, 2023 Security Staffing Plan Update to the Health Commission reports that:

The plan would reduce deputies by 11.4 FTE and add 29.4 FTE of BERT staff to create a 24-hour BERT program in the Emergency Department.
DPH proposed supporting BERT with non-uniformed cadets trained as “healthcare ambassadors,” not with additional deputies.
By early 2023, BERT was fully implemented and, instead of calling law enforcement, staff were calling BERT to thousands more “risk behavior” events than the Sheriff’s Office, with over 80% of BERT activations — and nearly 90% of Emergency Department BERT activations — occurring without any law enforcement present.
In July 2023, the 11.4 FTE of deputies was officially removed from the ZSFGH work order, reducing deputies from 30 FTE to 21 FTE.

At the same time, the update memo notes that 46.5 FTE of “healthcare trained private security officers” were installed as hospital ambassadors at ZSFGH campus entry points.

“At the one campus that handles most of San Francisco’s stabbings, shootings, and psychiatric emergencies, DPH chose to send BERT and cadets into the room and push sworn deputies farther away,” Lomba said. “That is not a co-responder model — that’s a model designed to keep law enforcement out of the picture until after violence has already occurred.”

An expensive experiment, not a safety upgrade

DPH has sometimes framed these changes as modernization or rationalization of security. Their own FTE and cost figures tell a different story.

According to DPH’s Safety Services plan and subsequent updates:

At ZSFGH, DPH proposed to reduce the Sheriff work order by 11.4 deputy positions (about 14.5 FTE), while adding 31.9 FTE of BERT psych nurses/techs and 2.5 FTE care workers.
By August 2023, 29.4 FTE of BERT positions were funded, and 46.5 FTE of contracted “healthcare trained private security officers” were in place at ZSFGH campus entry points.
In their own cost comparisons, DPH shows that a small number of deputies and cadets account for several million dollars in annual cost, while dozens of private security officers are added on separate contracts, illustrating that DPH shifted money away from sworn and cadet roles toward a much larger private-security footprint.

At Laguna Honda Hospital, DPH’s example of “efficiency” makes the trade-off clear:

8.4 FTE of deputies cost significantly more than 34.6 FTE of private security officers, who were then used to provide 24-hour monitoring in multiple locations.

Taken together, these documents show that DPH did not simply “save money by replacing deputies.” The department reduced sworn coverage and then layered on:

Dozens of BERT clinical positions,
Dozens of contracted private security officers, and
Cadets or other non-sworn “ambassador”-type roles.

From SFDSA’s perspective, this amounts to an expensive and unproven security experiment: one that trades sworn patrol and rapid response for a more complicated mix of clinical teams and unarmed guards, while leaving fewer deputies immediately available when violence erupts.

The Association is calling on the City to disclose the full annual cost of the BERT-plus-private-security model at ZSFGH and explain why that funding was not instead used to fully staff a sworn patrol division and fixed-post deputies in the highest-risk units and posts at the hospital.

Misusing equity data to justify cutting deputies

DPH also relied on a single statistic to justify reducing deputies: that about 46% of use-of-force incidents against patients in one reporting period involved Black/African American patients.

SFDSA does not dispute that racial disparities are real and serious. However, the way the data are presented raises concerns:

The figures in DPH’s materials do not provide the racial breakdown of patients in the specific high-risk areas (ED, PES, inpatient psych) where most force is recorded.
The same Safety Services plan acknowledges that deputies assisting with patient restraints and defending staff against attacks drive a large share of force incidents, yet this context is not clearly presented when the “46% Black” figure is cited.

Despite these limitations, DPH used this disparity as one of the key reasons to reduce the Sheriff’s work order and expand BERT and non-sworn roles.

“If DPH truly wants equity, the answer is not to quietly pull deputies out of high-risk units and hope the numbers look better,” Lomba said. “The answer is to be honest about what is driving these incidents and to fix it in partnership with staff, patients, and the communities we serve.”

ZSFGH is not comparable to LA or Alameda

In its own Security Model responses, DPH repeatedly cites Alameda Health System and Los Angeles County hospitals as “comparable” to ZSF GH and as justification for its hybrid BERT / non-sworn model.

SFDSA believes this comparison is misleading:

One overloaded campus vs. multi-hospital systems
- Alameda and LA counties distribute trauma and psychiatric emergencies across multiple hospitals and trauma centers, with sheriff’s deputies and city police departments available to surge to calls.
- San Francisco relies on one safety-net campus — ZSFGH — as the City’s only Level-1 trauma center and only 24/7 psychiatric emergency department for roughly 1.5 million people in San Francisco and northern San Mateo County.
Co-responder vs. “keep deputies away”
- DPH’s own descriptions of Alameda and LA highlight hybrid security models that include healthcare security officers and county sheriff’s deputies as partners.
- At ZSF GH, by contrast, DPH cut deputies by roughly one-third and used BERT plus cadets and unarmed private security to handle most risk-behavior incidents, with success measured partly by how often law enforcement is not present.
Existing record of violence at ZSF GH
- ZSFGH’s own annual reports emphasize that healthcare workers are almost four times more likely than workers in most other industries to experience workplace violence and that the hospital has had to invest in BERT and security upgrades to address persistent safety issues.

Not just one building — a vertical city of high-risk patients

Not just one building — a vertical city of high-risk patients
When DPH reduced deputy positions at ZSFGH, they did not simply pull deputies off “one hospital building.” They thinned coverage across what is effectively a vertical city of high-risk patients.

ZSFGH is a dense hilltop campus made up of multiple multi-story towers and specialty buildings — trauma, medical-surgical units, HIV and infectious-disease clinics, psychiatric emergency, acute psych, and high-risk outpatient programs — all stacked on top of each other and connected by elevators, stairwells, skyways, and long interior corridors. Nearly all of San Francisco’s Level-1 trauma care, 24/7 psychiatric emergency, and safety-net inpatient care is concentrated on this single site.

When a call comes in from an upper floor or a remote ward, deputies have to navigate multiple floors, secured access points, and crowded hallways before ever reaching the scene. On a campus like that, “response-only” policing is not a theory problem, it is a time-and-distance problem: every minute of delay is more time for a stabbing, a strangulation, or an assault on staff to continue.

Cutting deputies in that environment does not just mean fewer uniforms in one lobby. It means fewer sworn officers available to cover an entire vertical grid of vulnerable units — from the Emergency Department to Ward 86 to psych and ICU floors — at the same time. That is the reality DPH chose to ignore when it redesigned security around BERT, cadets, and unarmed guards.

“You cannot treat a single, overloaded trauma and psych emergency hospital in San Francisco like just another line on a spreadsheet next to Alameda and LA,” Lomba said. “Those systems built co-responder models with deputies and clinicians together. DPH’s implementation at ZSFGH went in a different direction: fewer deputies, more complexity, and more distance between sworn officers and the highest-risk units.”

What SFDSA is demanding now

In light of the internal memos, equity data, cost figures, and the fatal Ward 86 stabbing, SFDSA is calling for:

Immediate restoration and expansion of assigned deputy-sheriff posts on high-risk units and posts at ZSFGH, including Ward 86, ED, PES, and critical inpatient floors, with a fully staffed sworn patrol presence on campus.
An independent safety and equity audit of ZSFGH’s security model — including BERT, cadets, private security, and deputy staffing — with full participation from frontline unions representing deputies, nurses, physicians, social workers, and other hospital staff.
Transparent incident reporting, including detailed breakdowns of workplace-violence events and use-of-force by unit, incident type (crime-related, psychiatric, medical), clinical factors, and who requested the response, so that decisions are based on full context rather than partial statistics.
A true co-responder model, where BERT clinicians work with trained, equipped deputies on the most dangerous calls, rather than being sent in instead of law enforcement.

“These memos show that the stakes at ZSFGH were always high: concentrated trauma, psychiatric emergencies, and a vulnerable patient population,” Lomba said. “What changed was DPH’s decision to move deputies out of the way and measure success by keeping law enforcement out of the room. After this tragedy, the City cannot pretend that model is working.”

Media Contact
San Francisco Deputy Sheriffs’ Association
Phone: (415) 696-2428

Media Package Link

London Breed’s Leadership: Enabling Chaos, Facilitating Addiction, and Failing San Francisco

October 24, 2024

San Francisco is in crisis. The city that was once the pride of the West Coast has become a symbol of lawlessness, addiction, and failed leadership. London Breed’s policies, flip-flopping on key issues, have taken us to this point. Under her watch, San Francisco has experienced record-high overdose deaths, rampant open-air drug use, and an escalation of public disorder.

In 2023, San Francisco witnessed the deadliest year on record for overdose deaths. More than 3,000 lives have been lost to fentanyl during Breed’s tenure, and the city has spiraled into chaos. Yet, despite these catastrophic numbers, Mayor Breed continues to mislead San Franciscans with failed policies, political opportunism, and inconsistency.

As the 2024 mayoral election approaches, San Franciscans must ask themselves: Is this the future we want for our city?

Breed’s Flip-Flopping on Safe Consumption Sites: A Failed Experiment

In 2020, Mayor Breed announced her plan to create safe consumption sites, where individuals could use drugs under supervision. Breed championed these sites as part of a broader “harm reduction” strategy to address the opioid crisis. But as overdose deaths skyrocketed, it became clear that these policies were not solving the problem. Instead, they were enabling it.

Breed’s support for the Tenderloin Linkage Center, a “state of emergency” experiment in the heart of San Francisco’s Tenderloin District, allowed drug users to openly consume narcotics under the guise of harm reduction. In just 11 months, the center reversed 333 overdoses, but rather than addressing the root cause of addiction or cleaning up the streets, the site became a symbol of Breed’s failure to get control of the crisis.

Breed’s response? Close the center without explanation in December 2022. Her experiment ended, leaving the city with nothing but higher death tolls and continued disorder. Instead of delivering solutions, Breed’s leadership amounted to little more than an expensive failed experiment.

Inconsistency at the Helm: Political Survival Over San Francisco’s Well-Being

Breed’s recent pivot to law-and-order rhetoric is nothing more than an attempt to salvage her political career as the 2024 mayoral election approaches. After years of enabling open-air drug use through her harm reduction policies, she has now begun increasing police patrols and arrests in a transparent effort to convince voters she’s serious about public safety.

This shift isn’t based on conviction or a real plan—it’s pure political calculation. Mayor Breed has seen the writing on the wall. She knows San Franciscans are fed up with the lawlessness, the crime, the rampant drug use, and the neglect of public safety. But after years of facilitating and perpetuating addiction, her sudden crackdown rings hollow.

Where was this concern for public safety when she allowed open drug use in the Tenderloin? Where was the law-and-order approach when she pushed for safe consumption sites while overdose deaths surged to record highs?

Breed’s actions show a clear pattern: she panders to public opinion only when it benefits her politically. In 2020 and 2021, it was politically expedient to push for harm reduction. Now, with an election looming, she’s flipped to a tougher stance on crime. But after years of enabling the very disorder she now claims to be addressing, can San Franciscans trust her sudden shift?

Safe Consumption Sites: Enabling Lawlessness, Perpetuating Addiction

Breed’s support for safe consumption sites has had devastating consequences. While these sites were supposed to reduce harm, they normalized drug use and contributed to the public disorder that now defines San Francisco’s streets. And the evidence is clear: under Breed’s leadership, overdose deaths soared.

Governor Gavin Newsom, recognizing the dangers posed by these sites, vetoed a state bill that would have allowed them to operate legally. Yet, even after this veto, Breed continued to push for local sites, defying state law and ignoring the public’s safety.

Her insistence on opening safe consumption sites, even when faced with overwhelming evidence that they were failing, shows a clear disregard for the well-being of San Francisco’s residents. Instead of providing treatment and recovery options, these sites acted as enablers of addiction, keeping people trapped in a cycle of drug use and dependence.

San Francisco needs leadership that prioritizes recovery, safety, and accountability. Mayor Breed’s harm reduction strategy has failed. Her inconsistency and opportunism have created an environment where addiction flourishes, crime rises, and families feel unsafe.

Mark Farrell: The Leader San Francisco Needs

In contrast to Breed’s failed leadership, Mark Farrell has a clear, consistent, and actionable plan to fix San Francisco. He understands that law and order are essential to rebuilding the city, but he also knows that addiction must be treated with a recovery-first approach.

Farrell’s plan focuses on:

Declaring a fentanyl state of emergency, with more armed California National Guard officers to address open-air drug markets and trafficking.
Building a large-scale, 24/7 centralized intake center, staffed with social workers and medical professionals, to triage those in need and guide them through recovery.
Scrapping Breed’s failed Overdose Prevention Plan, which has enabled drug use, and shifting the focus to recovery-first and abstinence-based options.
Increasing police staffing levels to serve as a deterrent to drug dealing and public drug use, while also providing more recovery beds and detox opportunities for those in need.
Reforming pretrial detention to end the cycle of catch-and-release policies that Breed allowed to flourish, and ensuring that individuals revived with Narcan receive mandated treatment.

Mark Farrell’s vision is one of a cleaner, safer, and thriving San Francisco—a city where families can walk the streets without fear, where businesses can prosper, and where addiction is treated as a public health crisis with real solutions, not empty promises.

Time to Choose: Failed Leadership or Real Change?

San Franciscans deserve better than London Breed’s inconsistency and political gamesmanship. Under her watch, our city has fallen into chaos. Her policies have facilitated addiction, enabled lawlessness, and contributed to the deterioration of public safety.

Mark Farrell offers the real leadership San Francisco needs. He has a plan to save lives, restore safety, and clean up our streets. This election is a choice between more of the same chaos under Breed or a better, brighter future for San Francisco with Farrell at the helm.

The choice is yours. Vote for Mark Farrell. It’s time to fix San Francisco.

“Paid for by the San Francisco Deputy Sheriffs’ Association PAC. Not authorized by a candidate or committee controlled by a candidate. Financial disclosures are available at sfethics.org.”

The Unaddressed Crisis in San Francisco’s Jails: Accountability Starts at the Top

June 17, 2024

In recent months, the deteriorating conditions in San Francisco’s jails have reached a critical point, prompting widespread concern and media attention. The escalating violence, severe staffing shortages, and the influx of mentally ill and drug-addicted inmates have created an environment of chaos and danger. Despite these alarming developments, Mayor London Breed and Sheriff Paul Miyamoto have failed to address these issues with the urgency and solutions required.

The Gravity of the Situation

The situation in San Francisco’s jails is dire. Lockdowns are increasingly frequent as deputies struggle to manage confrontations with inmates. The jails are overcrowded with individuals suffering from mental illness and substance abuse disorders, creating a volatile atmosphere. Deputies are being attacked and hospitalized, highlighting the risks they face daily. This environment is not only unsafe for staff but also undermines any attempts at rehabilitation for inmates.

Leadership Failures

Mayor London Breed and Sheriff Paul Miyamoto bear significant responsibility for this crisis. Their lack of decisive action and failure to implement effective solutions have allowed these conditions to worsen.

Inadequate Staffing: The staffing crisis in the Sheriff’s Department is well-documented. Despite being aware of the workforce shortage, there has been no effective plan to recruit and retain deputies. Qualified candidates are being lost to other jurisdictions due to slow hiring processes and inadequate incentives. This failure to staff up has left existing deputies overworked and unable to maintain order and safety.
Lack of Comprehensive Planning: The increase in arrests, particularly of drug users and individuals with mental health issues, was foreseeable. Yet, there was no comprehensive plan to manage the resultant surge in the jail population. The lack of foresight and preparation has resulted in inmates being housed in inadequate facilities with insufficient support and programming.
Neglect of Inmate Rehabilitation: Programs that could help rehabilitate inmates and reduce recidivism, such as education and mental health services, are suffering due to staff shortages. The reduced number of deputies means fewer classrooms and fewer opportunities for inmates to engage in constructive activities. This neglect hampers efforts to rehabilitate inmates and prepare them for reintegration into society.

The Call for Accountability

It is clear that Mayor Breed and Sheriff Miyamoto have not prioritized the safety and well-being of San Francisco’s inmates and deputies. Their inaction and lack of strategic planning have contributed to the current crisis. The chaotic conditions in the jails are a direct result of leadership failures at the highest levels.

San Franciscans must demand accountability. The well-being of inmates and deputies should be a top priority, not an afterthought. Mayor Breed and Sheriff Miyamoto need to:

Implement an Immediate Staffing Plan: Expedite the hiring process for deputy sheriffs and provide competitive incentives to attract and retain qualified staff.
Develop Comprehensive Care Plans: Establish robust mental health and substance abuse programs to address the needs of the inmate population.
Ensure Proper Facilities and Resources: Invest in adequate facilities and resources to support inmate rehabilitation and safety.

The current state of San Francisco’s jails is unacceptable. It reflects a broader neglect of the criminal justice system and the people within it. For the safety of our community and the integrity of our justice system, it is imperative that Mayor Breed and Sheriff Miyamoto take immediate and decisive action to resolve these issues. San Francisco deserves better, and it starts with holding our leaders accountable.

Demanding Action: San Francisco Deputy Sheriffs Association Calls for Urgent Staffing Solutions

April 23, 2024

In a bold move to address the critical staffing shortages plaguing the San Francisco Sheriff’s Office (SFSO), the San Francisco Deputy Sheriffs’ Association (SFDSA) has issued an open letter to Sheriff, Mayor, and Board Supervisor President. The letter, signed by SFDSA President Ken Lomba, demands immediate action to recruit and hire Deputy Sheriffs to alleviate the current crisis.

The urgency of the situation cannot be overstated. A recent survey conducted by Dr. Lois James, PhD, revealed shocking statistics regarding the sleep, health, and wellness of SFSO deputies. With an average of only 5.25 hours of sleep per 24-hour period, deputies are facing serious risks to their health and safety. The survey also found high rates of physical and mental health problems among deputies, including high blood pressure, sleep apnea, depressive symptoms, and anxiety.

Despite these alarming findings, SFSO deputies are working an average of 28 hours of overtime per week, nearly tripling the recommended limit set by Occupational Safety and Health guidelines. This excessive overtime not only contributes to fatigue and health issues but also increases the risk of incidents and accidents on the job.

The cost analysis conducted by Dr. James further highlights the urgency of the situation. It is more cost-effective to increase the workforce by approximately 50% than to rely on overtime to fill staffing gaps.

In light of these findings, the SFDSA is demanding immediate action from Sheriff, Mayor, and Board Supervisor President. The association calls for the allocation of necessary funding to recruit and hire additional Deputy Sheriffs to ensure the safety and well-being of deputies and the public.

The SFDSA’s open letter serves as a clarion call for action. It demands results and concrete steps to address the staffing crisis in the SFSO. If no action is taken, the SFDSA is prepared to escalate its efforts and inform the public about the gravity of the situation.

The time for action is now. The safety and well-being of our deputies and our community depend on it.

Ken Lomba
President
San Francisco Deputy Sheriffs’ Association

San Francisco’s Betrayal: City Offers $53 Incentive to Keep Deputy Sheriffs

April 4, 2024

In a shocking turn of events, the City and County of San Francisco has revealed its true colors in the latest contract negotiations with Deputy Sheriffs. Despite years of dedicated service and sacrifice, Deputy Sheriffs are being offered a meager 1% longevity incentive if they continue to work past 20 years.

This offer is not just insulting; it’s a blatant disregard for the safety and security of San Francisco’s residents. While Deputy Sheriffs are offered a mere $53 per paycheck to delay their well-deserved retirement, the City has shown a stark contrast in its treatment of other departments.

In 2023, Dispatchers were given a 5% longevity incentive, totaling over $1.5 million distributed to eligible dispatchers, to retain them from retiring. The police department fared even better, with an additional 13% in longevity incentives, totaling a staggering $65.85 million distributed to eligible officers.

With 160 Deputy Sheriffs eligible to retire this year after dedicating at least 20 years of their lives to serving and protecting the City, the City’s offer is not just a slap in the face; it’s a betrayal of trust. It sends a clear message that the City does not value the contributions and sacrifices of Deputy Sheriffs.

Moreover, the San Francisco Sheriff’s Office (SFSO) is facing a severe staffing shortage, currently short-staffed by -178 deputy sheriffs. This shortage has led to overworking of Deputy Sheriffs with forced overtime, putting additional strain on an already taxed workforce.

Adding to the problem is San Francisco’s notoriously long and slow hiring process. What will San Francisco do when $53 dollars a paycheck does not retain Deputy Sheriffs from retiring? The consequences could be catastrophic. The courts could come to a grinding halt, jails could become out of control, inmates and employees would be at risk, and there would be fewer deputies on the streets for public safety. The entire system could collapse under the weight of these challenges.

It’s time for the City to wake up and recognize the dedication and commitment of Deputy Sheriffs. They deserve a fair and respectful longevity incentive that reflects their years of service and ensures the continued safety of San Francisco. Anything less is a disgraceful betrayal of those who put their lives on the line every day to keep our city safe.

San Francisco’s Soft-on-Crime Disaster: Operant Conditioning Fuels a Breeding Ground for Criminals

June 6, 2023

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

The abysmal state of San Francisco’s criminal justice system has reached a boiling point, as its leniency towards offenders who violate the conditions of their electronic monitoring and the San Francisco Pretrial Diversion Project is exposed. This shocking revelation exposes a broken system driven by the misguided principles of operant conditioning, inadvertently nurturing a breeding ground for criminals. Today, we uncover the harrowing consequences of operant conditioning and demand an immediate and radical overhaul of the city’s failing approach.

Operant Conditioning: Electronic Monitoring and Violations

San Francisco’s criminal justice system has become a haven for criminal activity due to its nonsensical handling of inmates on home detention by electronic monitoring. Instead of facing the full weight of their actions, violators are shamefully granted multiple chances and reinstated on electronic monitoring. This revolving door of leniency perpetuates a dangerous cycle of wrong behavior, effectively rewarding offenders for their transgressions. The result? A community plagued by escalating crime rates and a complete erosion of accountability and deterrence.

Operant Conditioning: San Francisco Pretrial Diversion Project

The San Francisco Pretrial Diversion Project has devolved into an utter farce, fueled by operant conditioning gone awry. Offenders placed on project own recognizance who repeatedly violate the terms are granted chance after chance, creating an environment where criminal behavior thrives. By indulging in this unfathomable leniency, the system inadvertently breeds a culture of impunity, where offenders learn that there are no real consequences for their actions. This betrayal of justice undermines the very fabric of our society and endangers the safety of law-abiding citizens.

The Reinforcement of Criminal Behavior

San Francisco’s woefully lenient criminal justice system, driven by the dangerous principles of operant conditioning, is single-handedly responsible for the surge in criminal activity. By allowing offenders to evade incarceration and doling out feeble consequences for their violations, the system effectively nurtures a generation of criminals. It sends a chilling message that criminal behavior goes unpunished, perpetuating a cycle of lawlessness and emboldening wrongdoers. The consequences are dire: innocent lives shattered, neighborhoods gripped by fear, and a city held hostage by its own failed policies.

The Urgent Need for Drastic Change

The time for half-hearted measures and empty promises is over. San Francisco’s criminal justice system demands a seismic shift towards accountability and decisive action. It is imperative that city officials, law enforcement agencies, and community leaders come together with unwavering determination to enact sweeping reforms. This includes implementing stringent consequences that strike fear into the hearts of criminals, dismantling the perverse incentives created by operant conditioning, and restoring the bedrock principles of justice and public safety.

Rebuilding San Francisco’s Future

The catastrophic consequences of San Francisco’s soft-on-crime disaster demand an immediate response. It is time to cast aside failed ideologies and embrace a bold, new vision for the city’s criminal justice system. By rejecting the flawed principles of operant conditioning and embracing a tough stance on crime, San Francisco can reclaim its reputation as a safe and thriving community. It is a pivotal moment, requiring courage, resilience, and an unwavering commitment to restore law and order.

Media Contact:

Ken Lomba
President
San Francisco Deputy Sheriffs’ Association
415-696-2428

San Francisco Deputy Sheriffs are Highly Trained Individuals

January 14, 2023

San Francisco Deputy Sheriffs are highly trained individuals who play a crucial role in maintaining law and order within the city. As 830.1 Peace officers, they have the same level of training and qualifications as a SFPD Police Officer.

The training process for a recruit deputy begins with a 6.5-month Post Certified Academy, which is currently held at the South Bay Regional Academy in San Mateo or Santa Rosa Junior College. Once the recruit graduates from the POST Academy, they must pass a four-week Board of State & Community Corrections Certified Jail Corrections Course.

The San Francisco Sheriff’s Office places a strong emphasis on ongoing training for their sworn staff. In addition to the 24 Hrs. of Certified POST training that must be completed biennially, all SFSO sworn staff attend an additional 24 Hrs. of certified Board of State and Community Corrections BSCC training annually. This means that San Francisco Deputy Sheriffs receive more mandated training than a police agency.

In addition to standard training, the San Francisco Sheriff’s Office has trained their sworn staff on a 16 Hr. mandatory Crisis Intervention Training (CIT) which emphasizes de-escalation and situational awareness when dealing with individuals with mental disorders, developmental disabilities, and altered mental status. This training was conducted FY 2019-2020 and was again offered FY 2021-2022. Deputies also receive 4 Hrs. of Force Option Simulator Training which emphasizes situational awareness, de-escalation, and Use of Force decision making. All sworn personnel attended in FY 2019-2020 and recently attended 4 hrs. during the recent 2021-2022 cycle.

The San Francisco Sheriff’s Office also has a POST certified Field Training Program (Like the SFPD) and was one of the first agencies to develop their manual to meet the new POST requirements.

In terms of investigations, the San Francisco Sheriff’s Office has their own Criminal Investigations Unit staffed with trained investigators who receive the same POST Training as SFPD Investigators. All investigators have attended the 76 Hr. Robert Presley Institute of Criminal Investigation Training and 40 Hr. Behavioral Awareness Training Institute. They are trained and equipped to investigate all crimes that fall under the Sheriff’s Office jurisdiction, including non-custody felony crimes in the field.

The San Francisco Sheriff’s Office also has an Emergency Services Unit (ESU) with 150 Sheriff’s Deputies assigned to it. All ESU staff are chosen after passing a written and physical exam and receive a 40-hour course that covers advanced firearms training, crowd control, building search, active shooter training, and medical rescue. ESU members receive an additional 40 Hrs. of training minimum.

The Special Response Team (SRT) is a highly trained unit within the ESU. To qualify, members must first be part of the ESU and pass a physical challenge, firearms proficiency exam, simulation exercise, written exam, and oral interview panel. Chosen members are then required to attend an 80 Hour SWAT school and receive additional monthly training.

Finally, the San Francisco Sheriff’s Office has a K-9 Unit, where a K-9 Team must attend a 40 hour dog handler course. A K-9 handler must partake in 16 Hrs. of monthly training minimum to meet POST standards to maintain basic patrol and/or detection proficiency.

In conclusion, San Francisco Deputy Sheriffs are well-trained and highly qualified individuals who play a vital role in maintaining law and order within the city. They undergo rigorous training and ongoing education to ensure they are equipped to handle any situation that arises.

SFDSA receives 2018 Gold Seal of Transparency from GuideStar

September 6, 2018

San Francisco Deputy Sheriffs’ Association was recently recognized for our transparency with a 2018 Gold Seal on our GuideStar Nonprofit Profile!

GuideStar is the world’s largest source of information on nonprofit organizations. More than 8 million visitors per year and a network of 200+ partners use GuideStar data to grow support for nonprofits. In order to get the 2018 Gold Seal, San Francisco Deputy Sheriffs’ Association shared important information with the public using our profile on www.guidestar.org.

Now our community members and potential donors can find in-depth information about our goals, strategies, capabilities, and progress. We’re shining a spotlight on the difference we help make in the world.

Check out our GuideStar Nonprofit Profile and tell us what you think: https://www.guidestar.org/profile/94-2838370